Chinese government scholars believe that discourse power comprises two, mutually reinforcing components: the “power to speak,” or to articulate a coherent vision for the world order, and the “power to be heard,” or to have audiences have exposure to, and then to buy into, this message.

China has identified both the digital realm and the geographic regions of the Global South as arenas of opportunity in advancing its goals and gaining a discourse-power advantage over the United States.Ĭhina’s leadership has been transparent in outlining its goals for both gaining discourse power and implementing a strategy for doing so. As such, China’s leadership has come to see its ability to reshape the international order-or, at least, to decenter US power within it-as essential to the party’s future.Ĭhina’s leaders have clearly articulated that they believe that Western countries, and especially the United States, have been able to exert global dominance because they possess what China terms “discourse power” (话语权): a type of narrative agenda-setting ability focused on reshaping global governance, values, and norms to legitimize and facilitate the expression of state power.įor the CCP, gaining discourse power translates into an ability to increase China’s geopolitical power by creating consensus around an alternative, China-led international order-one that privileges state sovereignty over civil liberties, and that subordinates human rights to state security. China believes that the United States currently dominates the international system, and sees growing Western opposition to China as evidence that the current order is now a threat to the continued security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As China’s military and economic power has grown, so has its ambition to shape global norms to suit its priorities.

Chinese military presence in canada